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This paper describes the main trends of Brazil’s fiscal policy during the last decade and 
analyzes: (1) the ability to raise the primary surplus in response to external shocks, (2) the 
pro-cyclical nature of fiscal policy, and (3) the long-run impact of government 
expenditure composition and taxation.  
 
The use of the primary balance as a policy tool is analyzed within the Drudi-Prati model, 
wherein the government uses the primary balance to reveal its commitment to service its 
debt.  We verify that both the debt ratio and the primary balance are determinants of 
spreads and credit ratings in Brazil.  However, the relationship is non-linear: the impact 
of the primary balance on spreads is amplified as the debt ratio increases.  
 
Using an Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) approach, we analyze the relationship 
between the primary balance and economic activity, finding a positive correlation in the 
long run. However, in the short run, fiscal expansions are associated with primary 
balance reductions and vice-versa during output contractions confirming the procyclical 
nature of fiscal policy in the short run.  
 
The paper uses two approaches, ARDL and a cointegrating VAR, to analyze the 
interaction between public expenditure composition and taxation on growth.  Similar 
results are obtained: large elasticities of output with respect to capital stocks, a significant 
negative impact of taxation on long-run GDP, and a negative impact of increasing 
government consumption and transfer payments on GDP.  These results shed light on the 
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I.  Introduction 
 
Throughout the 1990s, Brazil started a process of economic reform including 
liberalizing trade, relaxing price controls, and privatizing public enterprises.  Although 
some problems remained at first, such as higher public sector deficits and limited 
exchange rate flexibility, the country corrected most of these and steered a course toward 
stability by the end of the millennium. In fact, since 1999, Brazil has made substantial 
efforts to adjust its fiscal accounts. The country has moved in the direction of credible 
rules that govern the outcome of the budget process and procedures that contribute to 
providing incentives and constraints to promote fiscal discipline and increase 
transparency. The hallmarks of these measures include the Fiscal Responsibility Law and 
the impressive primary surplus targets achieved between 1999 and 2005. 
 
Despite the impressive results some vulnerabilities still remain. In particular, the 
quality of the fiscal adjustment brings doubts about growth prospects and the own 
continuity of the hard fiscal stance. The fiscal adjustment has been accomplished through 
strong revenue increases (the tax burden has grown from 29 percent of GDP in 1998 to 
35 percent in 2004) and by curtailing public investment (investments by federal 
government fell from 1.1 percent of GDP in 1998 to 0.5 percent in 2005).  The increase 
of the tax burden and the compression of public investment are harming growth prospects 
which can complicate future debt dynamics. On the other hand, the permanent increase of 
current expenditures and the impossibility to maintain the tax burden growth are 
negatively affecting the sustainability of the current fiscal adjustment effort. To sustain 
growth while re-orienting public finance towards investment therefore represents the next 
chapter of Brazil’s national economic reforms. 
 
The paper is organized in four sections following this introduction. The first 
describes the main fiscal trends since the 1990s, focusing mostly on the period 1999-
2005. The second section focuses on a mechanism that would allow fiscal policy to be 
more responsive to shocks, by permitting automatic stabilizers to operate throughout the 
business cycle to mitigate the pro-cyclicality of Brazilian fiscal accounts. This section 
computes the long-run effects of different variables on the primary balance and estimates 
the cyclical component of the primary surplus. The third section examines the long-term 
impact of public finance on growth, using a modified production function approach,  in 
which private and public capital are considered inputs, jointly with different types of 
public expenditure. Results indicate large elasticities of output with respect to capital 
stocks, negative impact of public consumption and transfers in the long run, and a 
significant negative impact of taxation on long-run GDP. The fourth section summarizes 
the results and concludes.   2
 
I.  Background: Brazilian Fiscal Policy during 1990-2005 
 
This section is divided into four parts. The first one describes fiscal outcomes 
during the last 15 years, focusing on the fiscal adjustment of 1999-2005. The second 
section highlights the flexibility of fiscal policy during this volatile period, and examines 
the role of the primary surplus as a signaling device in a world of imperfect information. 
The third section assesses the quality of the fiscal adjustment identifying the type of 
adjustment carried out-revenue increasing or expenditure cutting. The fourth section 
attributes the type of fiscal adjustment to the high budget rigidity. 
 
 
A.  Fiscal Policy Trends in Brazil  
 
During the last years of the military regime, the Brazilian public sector showed 
signs of financial fragility.  Slower growth combined with the external shocks, led to a 
fall in public sector savings.  The re-democratization process deepened the fiscal 
disequilibria, because the new democratic government set out to satisfy repressed social 
demands for redistribution. The 1988 Constitution expanded the social responsibilities of 
the state, guaranteed free access to social services, established higher social security 
benefits, and defined a generous regime for public sector employees (Bevilaqua and 
Werneck, 1998).  The new Constitution also modified the federal fiscal system, creating 
an imbalance between resources and responsibilities among levels of government.  
Finally, the 1988 Constitution increased the rigidity of public spending through the 
earmarking of an important part of fiscal revenues. 
 
These measures had a very perverse effect on public finances, but inflation 
postponed the collapse of the fiscal regime.  During this high-inflation period, the 
asymmetric indexation to inflation of revenues and expenditures, higher for revenues than 
for expenditures, produced artificially positive balances (Cardoso, 1998).  Additionally, 
the negative real interest rates and the inflation tax generated soft budget constraints and 
positive fiscal outcomes.  
 
The evolution of fiscal accounts during 1990-2005 can be divided into three sub-
periods, as shown in Figure 1.  The first one, 1990-1994, registers positive primary 
outcomes and operational equilibriums. In the second one, from 1995 to 1998, the 
primary surplus vanishes, while the last sub-period, 1999-2003, corresponds to the fiscal 
adjustment years and shows a permanent improvement of the primary surplus from -0.2% 
of GDP in 1998, to 4.7% in 2005.   
   3
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The end of the inflationary process in the mid 1990s coincided with deteriorating 
fiscal outcomes in 1995-98. Inflation was not only a revenue source, but was also a useful 
mechanism to control government spending in real terms during the high inflation era 
(Cardoso, 1998). This loss of flexibility, combined with a lack of decisive fiscal reform, 
produced rising public sector deficits. The excess spending relative to national income 
was financed in liquid international capital markets, with public debt rising from 29% of 
GDP in 1994 to almost 42% in 1998. 
 
The central bank sterilized these capital inflows through open market operations 
to avoid monetary expansion and maintain a pegged exchange rate.  This response 
complicated the situation even more because it entailed rising central bank (domestic) 
debt and climbing interest rates that raised the cost of servicing public debt.  High interest 
rates combined with the pegged exchange rate attracted even more capital, worsening the 
state of affairs.  The higher debt and the rigid fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate 
policies, left the economy vulnerable and with no capacity to absorb shocks.  When the 
Asian and Russian financial crises occurred in 1997-1998, Brazil was severely affected 
due to its sizeable external financing requirements. In January 1999, the central bank 
abandoned its crawling peg exchange rate regime in favor of a flexible rate and adopted 
an inflation-targeting framework for managing monetary policy. 
 
In 1999, the country tackled its fiscal imbalance by launching the Fiscal Stability 
Program, which consisted not only in raising taxes, but also in designing a legal 
framework for fiscal policy management.  The government set and met stringent targets 
for the primary fiscal surplus; the public sector primary surplus increased permanently 
from 3.3 percent of GDP in 1999 to 4.7 percent of GDP in 2005.   
 
However, the high interest rates and the exchange rate devaluations of 1999, 2001 
and 2002 prevented a more accentuated reduction of operational deficits. Consequently, 
the primary surpluses were not sufficient to truncate the rising path of public debt. Table 
1 compares the three periods. During 1995-98, the operational balance deteriorated by 
almost 5% of GDP in comparison with the period 1990-94. This was a result of a rise of 
1.5% of GDP in interest payments and a fall of the primary surplus of 3.5% of GDP. The 
federal government was responsible for 60% of fall in the operational balance, and for   4
more than 40% in the decrease of the primary surplus. States and local governments and 
public enterprises were responsible for 30% each for the worsening of the results. 
 
Due mostly to the 2002 debt crisis (analyzed in the next section) and to tight 
monetary policy, interest payments rose from 4.8% of GDP in the 1995-98 period to 5.5 
percent of GDP in 1999-2005.  The operational balance improved by 3.5% of GDP, from 
–5% of GDP to -1.5% of GDP corresponding to an improvement of 4.2% of GDP in the 
primary balance. The Federal government contributed half the adjustment, while state 




Table 1: Fiscal Balances*, 1990-2005 
   Annual Averages (% of GDP) 
   1990-1994 1995-1998 1999-2005 
   (A)  (B)  (C) 
          
I  Operational Balance (III - 
II)  -0.05 -5.01 -1.46 
        Federal Government  0.52 -2.48 -1.72 
        States and Municipalities  -0.25 -1.98 -0.30 
        Public Enterprises  -0.31 -0.55 0.54 
          
          
II  Real Interest Payments  3.33 4.84 5.48 
        Federal Government  1.26 2.78 4.13 
        States and Municipalities  0.86 1.64 1.08 
        Public Enterprises  1.20 0.42 0.24 
          
          
III  Primary Balance  3.27 -0.17 4.01 
        Federal Government  1.78 0.30 2.41 
        States and Municipalities  0.61 -0.34 0.78 
        Public Enterprises  0.89 -0.13 0.82 
           
* ( + ) Surplus ( - ) Deficit     
 
B. The Flexible Primary Surplus as a Device to Signal Fiscal Sustainability 
 
How do governments that are not fully credible signal regime sustainability?  
Based on the Drudi-Prati (2000)
3 model that rationalizes debt accumulation and delayed 
stabilization, we analyze the Brazilian case.  The main testable implication of the Drudi-
Prati (DP) model is the existence of a positive relationship between the spreads and the 
                                                 
2 Regarding the operational balance, the federal contribution was low (only 16%) due to the impact of the 
greater effect of interest rates on federal accounts. On the other hand, the interest payments for state and 
municipalities have been reduced because of the bail-out operation of 1997-98. This operation has 
substituted state bonds for federal bonds and re-scheduled state debt, producing a subsidy from the federal 
government to the states.  This means higher interest payments for the federal government and lower ones 
for state governments.  
3 Drudi, F. and A. Prati. (2000). “Signaling fiscal regime sustainability,” European Economic Review, Vol. 
44 pp. 1897-1930.   5
debt level and a negative association between spreads and primary balances. This 
relationship is conditioned on the debt level: Given uncertainty about the likelihood of 
default, the government will use the primary balance as a signaling tool to reveal to 
investors its true type. As the debt level rises, the dependable government (though not 
fully credible) will use more actively its primary balance as a signaling tool. 
 
Spreads on sovereign debt are crucial determinants of the nominal exchange rate 
in Brazil and on domestic interest rates.  What is the relation between these rates and the 
fiscal variables?  For Brazil, primary balances and spreads show a non-stable association 
(Figure 2).  From 1994 to 1998, when fiscal balances deteriorated, spreads declined.  
After 1999, when fiscal balances improved, spreads declined further.  Drudi and Prati 
verified this non-monotonic relationship in their study of several European countries. The 
relationship between public debt and spreads is also non-monotonic.  From 1994 –1997, 
when the debt ratio was low and slightly rising, spreads fell.  Since 1999, however, 
Brazilian spreads and debt ratios appear to have settled at a higher level (Figure 3).  
Drudi and Prati (DP) described a similar phenomenon for the European countries.   
 
 
The DP model predicts that the primary fiscal balances and public debt ratios 
enter the rating (spreads) function, and that the primary balance has a more influential 
role when debt ratios are high.  This section verifies econometrically the following three 
testable implications of the DP model: 1) Debt ratios and primary balances are 
complementary in the spreads function; 2) The signaling role of the primary balance 
increases with the debt ratio; and, 3) If the government is dependable, then the primary 
balance will rise when the debt ratio increases. 
 
To verify the complementary role of fiscal balances and debt ratios in the spreads 
function, we regressed the sovereign spreads on the first two variables (lagged).  Table 2 





Primary Fiscal Balances and Sovereign Spreads in Brazil   
1994-2003 
Figure 3 
Public Debt Ratio and Sovereign Spreads in Brazil  
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Table 2 
Complementary Roles of Debt Ratios and Primary Balances as Spreads' Determinants 
Dependent Variable: EMBORLAT 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample(adjusted): 1995:02 2002:01 
Included observations: 84 after adjusting endpoints 
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=3) 
Variable Coefficient Std.  Error t-Statistic  Prob. 
C -0.26 0.06 -4.45  0.00
DEBTY(-1) 0.01 0.00 4.48  0.00
PRIMBAL(-1) -0.02 0.01 -2.40  0.02
R-squared  0.454     Mean dependent var  -0.011
Adjusted R-squared  0.441     S.D. dependent var  0.083
S.E. of regression  0.062     Akaike info criterion  -2.698
Sum squared resid  0.309     Schwarz criterion  -2.611
Log likelihood  116.295     F-statistic  33.723
Durbin-Watson stat  0.362     Prob(F-statistic)  0.000
EMBORLAT= Brazil EMBI spreads orthogonalized from Latin EMBI average 
DEBTY= Debt to GDP ratio 
PRIMBAL= Primary fiscal balance 
 
The second implication of the DP model, namely the changing nature of the 
signaling role of primary balances, is captured by two alternative approaches.  First, a 
dummy variable is defined for a specific signaling period and interacted with the primary 
balances.  The original regression is augmented with this new auxiliary variable, and the 
sum of both coefficients has to be larger than the primary balance coefficient by itself.  
For the second approach, an auxiliary variable is constructed by the interaction of the 
primary balances with the debt ratio.  If this variable is significant, then the hypothesis of 
the difference in the signaling role cannot be rejected.  
 
For the first approach, we defined the signaling period from June 1999 to the time 
when the inflation-targeting approach was adopted and the Fiscal Responsibility Law was 
enacted. Given the significance of this auxiliary variable (Table 3), we cannot reject the 
hypothesis that primary balances affected spreads more forcefully during this signaling 
period. The alternative approach (Table 4) shows that the primary balance coefficient 
rose with the debt ratio, implying that signaling takes time and is not a once-and-for-all 
event. Drudi and Prati obtained the same result for Italy and Belgium.   7
 
Table 3 
The Changing Role of Primary Balances–Test 1   
Dependent Variable: EMBORLAT 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample(adjusted): 1995:02 2002:01 
Included observations: 84 after adjusting endpoints 
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=3) 
Variable Coefficient Std.  Error t-Statistic  Prob. 
DEBTY(-1) 0.013764 0.002046 6.726813  0.0000
PRIMBAL(-1) 5.95E-05 0.005334 0.011153  0.9911
DSIG*PRIMBAL(-1) -0.054382 0.012458 -4.365126  0.0000
C -0.500954 0.075216 -6.660195  0.0000
R-squared  0.641035     Mean dependent var  -0.011316
Adjusted R-squared  0.627574     S.D. dependent var  0.082535
S.E. of regression  0.050368     Akaike info criterion  -3.092458
Sum squared resid  0.202958     Schwarz criterion  -2.976705
Log likelihood  133.8832     F-statistic  47.62098
Durbin-Watson stat  0.611709     Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000
All variables defined in preceding table         
DSIG= 1 for t> January 1999; 0 otherwise         
 
  Table 4 
The Changing Role of Primary Balances–Test 2 
Dependent Variable: EMBORLAT 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample(adjusted): 1995:02 2002:01 
Included observations: 84 after adjusting endpoints 
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=3) 
Variable Coefficient Std.  Error t-Statistic  Prob. 
C -0.530713 0.071481 -7.424499  0.0000
DEBTY(-1) 0.014446 0.001826 7.912960  0.0000
PRIMBAL(-1) -0.024688 0.003926 -6.288602  0.0000
PRIMBAL(-1)*(DEBTDEV) -0.002630 0.000572 -4.593340  0.0000
R-squared  0.632718     Mean dependent var  -0.011316
Adjusted R-squared  0.618945     S.D. dependent var  0.082535
S.E. of regression  0.050949     Akaike info criterion  -3.069552
Sum squared resid  0.207661     Schwarz criterion  -2.953799
Log likelihood  132.9212     F-statistic  45.93872
Durbin-Watson stat  0.632039     Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000
DEBTDEV=Deviation of the debt ratio from the sample mean       
 
The third and final implication of the DP model, the positive association between 
the primary balance and the debt ratio if the government is dependable is reflected in 
Table 5.    8
 
Table 5 
Primary Balances and Debt Ratios 
Dependent Variable: PRIMBAL 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample(adjusted): 1995:01 2002:01 
Included observations: 85 after adjusting endpoints 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
Variable Coefficient Std.  Error t-Statistic  Prob. 
C -2.921112 1.048574 -2.785795  0.0066
DEBTY(-1) 0.112549 0.022527 4.996247  0.0000
R-squared  0.247189     Mean dependent var  1.631294
Adjusted R-squared  0.238119     S.D. dependent var  2.060787
S.E. of regression  1.798774     Akaike info criterion  4.035336
Sum squared resid  268.5538     Schwarz criterion  4.092810
Log likelihood  -169.5018     F-statistic  27.25346
Durbin-Watson stat  0.049271     Prob(F-statistic)  0.000001
 
 
C. The Type of Brazilian Fiscal Adjustment, 1999-2005 
 
During the first four years of the Real Plan (1995-98), fiscal accounts were 
imbalanced due mostly to the loss of inflation as an adjustment mechanism and to the 
lack of decisive fiscal reform.  As Table 6 shows, the weaker fiscal stance registered 
during the1995-98 period is explained by rising expenditure, which grew by 16%, with 
personnel and social security benefits expanding the most.  Revenue rose just 8% or 1.4% 
of GDP, with growth concentrated on taxes, while the revenues of the Social Security 
System remained stable. In sum, the fiscal expansion of 1995-98 was caused by rising 
expenditure and not to revenue reduction.   
The adjustment of the federal fiscal accounts in the last six years has been based 
on revenue increases and investment cuts.  During 1999-2005, tax revenue rose by 4.6 % 
of GDP. Spending also grew, but at a slower rate: it rose by 2.5 percentage points of GDP 
during 1999-2005.  As in the 1995-98, current expenditure accounted for the bulk of the 
rise, while capital spending were reduced. In this case, personnel expenditures remained 
stable while social security benefits and intergovernmental transfers experienced more 
dramatic increases.  
The revenue-increasing nature of the 1999-2003 fiscal adjustment raises concerns 
about its sustainability.   International experience shows that revenue-based adjustments 
tend to be short-lived (Alesina and Peroti, 1996). As spending follows the rising revenue, 
the adjustment effort is weakened and the lasting effect is a larger government.   
 
   9
Categories
1990-1994 1995-1998 1999-2005 (B) - (A) Decomp I Decomp II (C) - (B) Decomp I Decomp II
(A) (B) (C)
I Total Revenue 17.3 18.6 23.2 1.3 7.7 102 100 4.6 24.6 222 100
      Treasury Revenue 11.9 13.6 18.0 1.7 14.6 132 130 4.3 31.8 210 95
           Tax Revenue 11.0 12.0 16.6 1.1 9.9 83 81 4.5 37.6 219 99
           Other Treasury Revenues 1.2 1.6 1.4 0.4 32.1 29 29 -0.2 -12.0 -9 -4
      Social Security Revenue 5.0 5.1 5.3 0.1 2.7 10 10 0.2 3.3 8 4
II Total Expenditure 15.8 18.4 20.8 2.6 16.4 -198 100 2.5 13.5 -120 100
      Personnel and Social Contributions 4.4 5.2 5.1 0.7 17.0 -57 29 -0.1 -1.3 3 -3
      Social Security Benefits 4.2 5.4 6.7 1.2 30.0 -95 48 1.3 23.4 -61 51
      Other Current and Capital Expenditures 4.3 4.8 5.2 0.5 11.1 -36 18 0.4 8.3 -19 16
           Subsidies 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.1 98.2 -8 4 0.1 51.3 -5 4
           FAT 0.2 0.6 0.6 0.3 138.7 -25 12 0.0 2.4 -1 1
           Other- Goods and Services and Investment  4.0 4.0 4.3 0.0 1.1 -3 2 0.3 6.8 -13 11
      Intergovernmental Transfers 2.9 3.0 3.9 0.1 3.9 -9 4 0.9 29.4 -43 36





Table 6: Federal Government Primary Surplus Changes, 1990 - 2005
Annual Averages (% of GDP) Variation 91/94 - 95/98 Variation 95/98 - 99/05
 
D.  The rigidity of expenditure as the main explanation of the type of adjustment  
 
Fiscal adjustment was revenue-based because of the rigidity of public spending.  
At the federal level, this rigidity is caused by three factors: i) the rise of  social security 
and social assistance benefits; ii) the job tenure stability rules for public servants made 
impossible reducing the public sector payroll;  and,  iii) the constitutional earmarking of 
an important part of federal tax revenues. 
 
The 1988 Constitution reinforced the three factors of expenditure rigidity through 
the concession of higher social security benefits and softening the eligibility criteria, 
defining a generous regime for official public employees which included job tenure and 
higher compensation and pension benefits equal to 100% of exit salaries, extending these 
benefits to all public sector employees and strengthening the intergovernmental transfers 
system. The 1988 Constitution favored the expansion of  social responsibilities of the 
state, guaranteeing free access to social services, particularly health services, creating the 
unemployment insurance, establishing minimum social security benefits (1 minimum 
wage), and universalizing it by extending coverage to rural workers.   
 
Figure 4 shows the rising share of mandatory spending between 1986 and 2003.  
The increasing rigidity is due to the rise of personnel, social security and assistance 
transfers, and the intergovernmental transfers to states and municipalities that increased 
from 55% of non-financial expenditure in 1986 to almost 80% in 2003.    10
Figure 4


































































As a result of the growing share of mandatory spending, investment and other 
current expenditures decreased their share from around 51% of primary expenditure to 
less than 20% in 2001. Clearly, social security transfers are the fastest-increasing type of 
expenditure, generating a huge deficit that has to be covered by the Treasury. Figure 5 
shows the evolution of the social security system imbalances during the period 1990-
2005. In 1990 the deficit was 1.4% of GDP in 2005 it reached 5.7% becoming the most 
important source of pressure for government accounts.   
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II. Policy Rigidity and the 2002 Crisis 
 
In sharp contrast with the 1998-1999 adjustment, Brazil’s fiscal policy did not 
react to the shocks in early 2002.  This policy rigidity compounded uncertainty arising 
from other sources and led to asset price changes that complicated the situation even 
more. The government’s commitment to maintain a constant primary surplus seemed to 
falter as the primary balance declined during the first semester (Figure 6) amidst a heated 




Primary Fiscal Balance of the Public Sector 2000-2003 
(as a percentage of GDP) 
Source:  Bacen, Boletin Estadistico, several issues 
 
 
The rigidity of fiscal policy may have been at the root of the 2002 crisis. 
Inflexibility was the result of structural factors and transitory circumstances. The 
structural inflexibility of the budget exists in expenditures as discussed in the previous 
section. But fiscal policy rigidity was also due to the short-term effect of the October 
presidential elections.  The government’s coalition had weakened because of internal 
disputes in anticipation of the presidential election. Additionally, corruption allegations in 
congress led to the impeachment of its president, a strong supporter of the government’s 
economic policy.  In this context, crucial reforms with fiscal impact, such as the public 
servants social security and tax reform, were left pending. Other reforms, such as the 
extension of the financial transactions tax, the CPMF, stalled. With the political 
campaign heating up in the first quarter, it was practically impossible to get support for 
any adjustment.  Additionally, any change would have been interpreted as transitory 
given that a new government would take office in the near future. 
Uncertainty regarding the future government’s commitment to fiscal adjustment 
(irrespective of who won the election) generated concerns about the future value or 
liquidity of public debt.  Given the concentration of public debt holdings in mutual funds 
(to be discussed in the next section), a large resource outflow affected them in the period 
April-October. In its peak, the run represented more than 6 percent of the intermediaries’ 
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Figure 7 
Net Resource Flow to Mutual Funds 
(as a fraction of  net worth) 
 
 
The sell-off of government securities caused a fall in their price (rising spreads), 
and pressured the exchange rate to depreciate (Figure 8).  The rising spreads and the 
exchange rate depreciation were also associated with capital outflows from Brazil.  As 
Figure 9 shows, in September and October  of 2002, capital outflows reached a peak of 
almost 20 percent of international reserves of the central bank.
4  During these months the 
exchange rate also reached a peak of 4 Reais per dollar.  Consequently, the debt level 
rose due to its indexing to the exchange rate.  This fact aggravated concerns on debt 
sustainability which exerted further downward pressure on the demand for Brazilian 
sovereign bonds and pushed their prices even lower in a vicious circle.   
 
Figure 8 
Brazilian Spreads and Exchange Rate 
Jan 2000 – April 2003 
Figure 9 
Capital Flows to Brazil 
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The fall of Brazilian government securities’ prices and capital outflows also 
occurred because of a global phenomenon: the rise in uncertainty and risk aversion 
caused by the growth slowdown in the industrialized nations, the terrorist attacks in the 
United States, and the corporate corruption scandals of the more mature capital markets 
around the world.  This fact exerted additional downward pressure on  Brazilian 
government bonds, and their prices moved in tandem with those of other assets 
worldwide (Figure 10).  Favero and Giavazzi (2003) show how Brazilian spreads depend 
on domestic factors (the stance of fiscal policy) and on global conditions. The 
relationship is non-linear: when domestic fundamentals are sound, this relationship is not 
as strong, but when fiscal fundamentals are weak, the effect of global factors is amplified.  
 
Figure 10 
Co-movement of Brazil C Bond Prices and the Dow Jones Index 
Evidence of Global Factors’ Influence on Brazilian Asset Prices 
 
 
Source:  World Bank staff calculations 
 
Faced with mounting difficulties in rolling over the domestic debt, the central 
bank redeemed a fraction of debt falling due by printing money.  Consequently, the 
monetary base expansion exceeded nominal GDP growth (Figure 11).  The monetary 
effect of public domestic debt redemptions during the second semester of 2002 reached 
the tenor of 30 percent of base money (Figure 12).  It is crucial to point out, however, that 
the monetary expansion originated by the treasury’s operation began in the second 
semester of 2001 and could have been interpreted as a leading indicator of the more 
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Figure 11 
Money Base as a Share of GDP 
(seasonally adjusted data 
Figure 12 
Monetary Impact of Treasury’s 
Operations 1999- 2003 
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Source: World Bank staff calculations based on 
Bacen data 
Source: World Bank calculations based on Bacen 
data 
 
Moreover, base money grew in lockstep with the faster depreciation of the 
currency.  This pressured inflation, which accelerated between June and December, 
reaching a peak of 5.8 percent per month in November (Figure 13).  Monetary growth 
and rising inflation increased the government’s revenue from money creation up to the 
equivalent of 2.0 percent of GDP
5 (Figure14).  In these circumstances, the authorities’ 
credibility faltered.  It is interesting to note that the seignorage peak occurred in the first 
quarter of 2003, a few months after the public debt ratio had stabilized and the exchange 
rate had appreciated.  This implies that interest rates could not be lowered as quickly as 
many would have desired. 
 
Figure 13 
Monthly Inflation Rate in Brazil 2000-2003 
(seasonally adjusted General Price Level 
IGP-DI) 
Figure 14 
Seignorage from Money Creation  
2000-2003 
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Source: FGV  Source:  World Bank calculations described in text. 
                                                 
5 The figures reported in the text and in the graph are estimated by multiplying the base money as a share of 
GDP times the growth rate on base money. Eliana Cardoso (1998) estimates the average inflation tax 
revenue in Brazil during the 50 years ending 1995 at 2 percent of GDP.    15
 
The monetary authorities reacted variously to the shocks during 2001-2002. 
Initially, from March 2001 to July 2001, the central bank raised the Selic rate from 15.25 
percent to 19 percent. From then on, it maintained the Selic at 19 percent, until February 
2002, when it reduced it 25 bps, then lowered it again in March and July.  In mid-October 
2002, the central bank bumped up the Selic three percentage points to 21 percent and then 
raised it two more times until reaching 25 percent before the year’s end (Figure 15). As 
the Selic rose, the exchange rate partially reversed its depreciating trend, and the debt 
stock (as a percent of GDP) decreased. Looking (ex-post) at this behavior, it is legitimate 
to wonder why the central bank did not raise interest rates before October. 
 
Several factors might explain the central bank delayed reaction and some are 
related to considerations described by Blanchard’s model. The first reason is that, before 
September-October, the fiscal conditions were inadequate.  Public debt to GDP increased 
from 49 percent to 53 percent in 2001, and climbed further to 57 percent by mid-2002 
without any policy response. With the primary balance decreasing during the first 
semester of 2002, it is understandable that sustainability concerns dominated investor 
sentiment.
6  With taxes and expenditures predetermined by the electoral process and the 
structural rigidity of the budget, the adjustment of the government’s real cash flow could 
come through several avenues:  an increase in the price level, a higher seignorage, or a 
default. The nature of the fiscal regime could have switched from one in which the 
primary surplus would be adjusted with certainty to ensure debt sustainability to one 
where there was uncertainty on how the adjustment would take place. A-priori it was 
difficult to envision how the adjustment would take place, and the composition of public 
debt, which we discuss in the following section, determined the final outcome. 
   
The crucial point to bear in mind is that, under the circumstances of rising debt 
levels with an unresponsive fiscal policy, raising the Selic could have been inflationary.
7  
The higher cost of debt service (with an unresponsive primary surplus) would have led to 
a higher probability of default.  This, in turn, would have accelerated capital outflows, 
increasing pressure on the currency to depreciate and hence, on inflation.  Since printing 
money and higher prices were part of the solution to the imbalance in the government’s 
present-value borrowing constraint, fiscal expectations were inconsistent with a stable 
price level.  In fact, since September 2001 inflation expectations were permanently above 
the central bank’s central target and by mid-2002 market expectations of inflation were 
regularly above the forecasts of the more robust models (Minella, et.al. 2003).   
Additionally, there is evidence of changes in the price formation mechanism in Brazil at 
the end of 2002 that researchers attribute to changes in the exchange rate pass-through 
(Belaisch, 2003).  However, these changes in the observed price formation and inflation 
                                                 
6 This is what Blanchard calls the “wrong” fiscal conditions.  Woodford (2001) call this a non-Ricardian 
environment.  A Ricardian environment is one in which expected future primary surpluses adjust to 
compensate variations in the present value of debt, while in non-Ricardian regimes this policy adjustment 
certainty is non-existent. 
7 Woodford (2001) shows how the price level may be determined by fiscal variables.  The government’s 
inability to balance its budget constraint via adjustments in the primary surplus implies that the price level 
is the adjustment mechanism. Hence, the budget constraint acts as an equilibrium condition which 
determines a unique price level associated with the particular fiscal policy.  Previous episodes of Brazilian 
inflation in the 1970’s and 1980s have been explained based on these grounds (Loyo, 1999).  The Favero-
Giavazzi and Blanchard papers extend this theory to allow the price of debt (or the sovereign risk premium) 
to be the adjusting factor.   16
expectations generating mechanisms could have also been the result of the changes in 
fiscal expectations arising from a different fiscal regime during this brief period.   
 
Empirical verification of the nature of the prevailing fiscal policy regime in a 
particular period poses challenges both from the conceptual and practical viewpoints. At 
the conceptual level, verification of the nature of the fiscal regime would require testing 
whether the primary surplus would have been the same if another price sequence would 
have been observed.
8  Unfortunately, history only shows the actual one realization of the 
price level and hence it is impossible to verify whether the surplus would have been the 
same with a different price sequence (Woodford, 2001; Kocherlakota et al., 1999).  
 
At the more practical level, verification of the character of the fiscal regime 
focuses on testing the responsiveness of the primary balance to changes in different 
variables (Bohn, 1998).  These tests perform regressions of the primary surplus on the 
public debt ratio and other control variables to verify the significance of this particular 
coefficient. A positive (and significant) response of the primary surplus to changes in the 
debt ratio implies that this policy variable was the adjustment factor.  In Brazil, the 
brevity of the period during which this regime change might have occurred, limits any 
statistical testing.  There are, however, studies that test this hypothesis using longer 
sample periods, with results extremely sensitive to the period of analysis. For instance, 
two papers report contradictory evidence: Favero and Giavazzi show that the primary 
surplus is highly persistent and unresponsive to any oscillation in the debt level; Wyplosz 
concludes that the observed surplus was similar to the one that would have resulted if the 
government had followed a rule that tried to stabilize the debt ratio while allowing some 
counter-cyclical action.  It is very likely that this divergence obeys to the different sample 
periods: while the first study estimates the relationship after July 1999, the second one 
begins in 1998.  Since there is a regime shift in fiscal policy in 1998-1999 described 
elsewhere (World Bank, 2000) and verified econometrically, the Favero-Giavazzi paper 
does not capture this change.  
 
The second explanatory factor for the central bank’s resistance to raise the policy 
rate was the vulnerable situation of mutual funds.  Given the run on mutual fund deposits, 
raising the Selic would have been extremely risky because of the potential to aggravate 
losses to these intermediaries. Mutual funds were registering losses due to updating their 
balance sheets with new mark-to –market regulation from the central bank.  Raising the 
Selic would have increased the risk of a generalized run on the system.  Additionally, in 
the face of a decreased demand of public bonds, to be described in the next section, the 
central bank was supporting the price of these assets.  Under this extraordinary 
circumstances imposed by the public bond price support role, equivalent to an interest 
rate peg, liquidity was endogenous, and hence it would have been contradictory to try to 
control liquidity (by raising  the Selic).
9  Given that monetary policy was unable to 
                                                 
8 In a controlled experiment situation, if another price (of goods or of sovereign debt) sequence could be 
associated with the same fiscal policy, then the hypothesis could be falsified. However, in reality we only 
observe the actual price sequence and, hence, cannot tell whether the fiscal policy would have been the 
same under a different price sequence. 
9 The Brazilian circumstances of a fixed primary surplus, and a central bank acting to support the price of 
public bonds ( peging the interest rate) fit perfectly  Woodford’s characterization of the  typical non-
Ricardian regime (Woodford, 1998, 2001), with the implication of the effect of fiscal expectations on the 
price level.   17
respond, it would have been desirable that fiscal policy had been more responsive to the 
shocks. 
 
By October 2002, the characterization of the economy had changed in several 
respects: (1) the run on mutual funds had been contained; (2) the presidential candidates 
had already agreed on sound fiscal policy principles; (3) the primary surplus reversed its 
decreasing trend and rose to unsurpassed levels.  Clearly, the factors that originated the 
“wrong” expectations were not present any more.  The central bank was then free to raise 
interest rates and quickly moved in this direction, bringing about the expected traditional 
results of the currency appreciating in response to tighter monetary policy as described in 
Figure 15.  Control of the economy was gradually regained and consolidated after the 
first quarter of 2003. 
 
Figure 15 





III. Procyclical Fiscal Policy in Brazil 
 
The vicious circle of procyclical fiscal policy, volatility and limited 
creditworthiness has been amply documented for Latin America (Gavin, Hausmann, 
Perotti and Talvi, 1996).  Pro-cyclical fiscal policy is explained by the following factors: 
a) limited access to international credit markets during a shock implies that countries are 
unable to follow a tax-smoothing approach and have to tighten fiscal policy; b) tax 
structures that are heavily dependant on cyclical-sensitive income, such as indirect taxes 
(Gavin and Perotti, 1997); and c) weak institutional structures that do not allow 
generation of large enough primary surpluses in good times and lead to increased 
spending during expansionary phases (Talvi and Vegh, 2000).  Several authors have 
attempted to documented the procyclical nature of Brazil’s fiscal policy ( IMF, WEO, 
2002) but results are not very robust.  
 
To examine the relationship between the primary balance and economic activity 
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approach (Pesaran and Shin, 1999, and Pesaran, Shin and Smith, 1999) because it is 
robust to the order of integration and cointegration of the regressors, hence the pre-testing 
procedures may be avoided.  This approach also has the advantage that the lags in each of 
the regressors are allowed to be different, and the endogeneity problem can be eliminated 
by appropriate selection of the lag length (Pesaran and Shin, 1999).  
 
Table 7 
Estimated Long-Run Coefficients for the Primary Balance 
1991:01 – 2002:01 
 AIC  RBSC  SBC  HQC 








































Standard error in (). *Significant at the .01 level; ** Significant at the .05 level; *** Significant at the  .10 
level 
 
Table 7 shows that, in the long run, output is positively correlated with the 
primary balance.  However, Table 8 shows that, in the short run, the correlation is 
negative, implying that fiscal expansions are associated with primary balance reductions, 
and the primary balance increases during output contractions, verifying the pro-cyclical 
nature of fiscal balances. Another interesting result depicted in Table 7 is the positive and 
significant relationship between the primary balance and the public debt ratio.  This fact 
may be interpreted as the result of a fiscally responsible sovereign that adjusts its primary 
to compensate changes in the debt ratio.   
 
Finally, in this section we estimate the cyclical component of the primary balance 
by regressing this variable on the long-run components of each of the explanatory 
variables used in the previous exercise.  The residual of such regression is the part of the 
primary balance explained by the transitory or cyclical components of each of the 
explanatory variables.  Hence, we interpret this residual as the cyclical component of the 
primary balance (Figure 16).  In general, we observe that this component fluctuates 
between plus or minus 1 percent of GDP, with the most recent levels close to lower 
bound. That is, at the end of 2003, the economic slowdown and other transitory 
fluctuations of variables affecting the primary balance had a negative impact of close to 
one percent of GDP, compared to the positive impact of more than one percent of GDP in 
early 2000.  Given that the observed primary balance improved by .5 percent of GDP 
during the period, the structural balance improved by close to 1.5 percent of GDP.   19
 
Table 8 
Error-correction Representation for the Selected ARDL models 1991-2002 
Dependent variable: d Primary Balance 
 AIC  RBSC  SBC  HQC 
Error-correction term(-1)  -.20* 
 
-.21* -.13*  -.14* 
dPrimary(-1) .04  .02     
dPrimary(-2) .17**  .16**     
dPrimary(-3)        
Ddebty -.014  .007  .018**  .017*** 
Ddebty(-1) -.038  -.013     
Ddebty(-2) -.027  -.018     
Ddebty(-3) -.081***  -.085*     
DOutput -1.87  -1.7  -1.27  -1.5 
dOutput(-1) -2.36*** -3.1**     
dOutput(-2) -3.18**  -3.6*     
dOutput(-3) -1.98***  -2.27**     
Dreer -1.49*  -.39  -1.2*  -1.4* 
DREER(-1)        
DREER(-2)        
DREER(-3)        
Dselicr -.0004  -.004  -.001**  .006 
dSelicr(-1) -.001  -.009     
dSelicr(-2) .001       
dSelicr(-3)        
Dembi .44**  .45**  0.4**  .43** 
dEmbi(-1) -.66*  -.60*  -.67**  -.63* 
dEmbi(-2)   -.30     
dEmbi(-3)        
 R-Bar
2 .30  .30  .21  .23 
D.W. 2.15  2.06  2.09  2.05 
*   Significant at the .01 level 
** Significant at the .05 level 
*** Significant at the  .10 level 
 
Figure 16: Cyclical Component of the Primary Balance 
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IV. Public Expenditure Composition and Growth 
 
In this section we estimate the long-run and short-run impact of government 
expenditure on Brazilian growth using two related methods.  First, we use the single-
equation ARDL methodology used in the previous section, and then we use a multiple-
equation co-integrating VAR approach to examine the relationship among the several 
variables.  
 
Using data for 1950-2000, the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) estimates a 
long run relationship and an error correction representation between income per capita, 
private and public capital stocks per capita and three components of government current 
expenditure (subsidies, social security and assistance transfers and consumption)
10. The 
estimation also included tax revenues and public debt as a share of GDP to control for the 
government’s budget identity and the potential negative effects of the government 
financing on economic activity. The data for the stocks of private and public capital were 
obtained from Reis et al (2002) and the flow data, that is income per capita and 
government current expenditures come from the National Accounts System - IBGE. 
 
Tables 9 and 10 report the long-run coefficients and short-run dynamics estimated 
with this method.
11    Table 9 shows that, in the long run the elasticity of output with 
respect to the public capital stock is larger than in that of the private sector.  The 
estimated elasticity seems high when it is compared with estimated values for the US or 
OECD economies (Sturn  and de Haan, 1995; Hurlin, 2001), but similar to existing 
Brazilian estimates for infrastructure (Cavalcanti, 2004).  However, the negative impact 
of the tax ratio is surprisingly large: an increase of 1 percentage point in the tax ratio 
lowers GDP per capita by 1 percent. 
                                                 
10 It also has the advantage that the lags in each of the regressors are allowed to be different, and the 
endogeneity problem can be eliminated by appropriate selection of the lag length (Pesaran and Shin, 1999) 
11 The tables report results for the different models: Akaika (AIC), Schwarz (SBC), R-Bar Squared (RBSQ) 
and Hanaan-Quinn (HQ).  The production function was estimated in per capita terms, dividing all the 
arguments by the economically active population.  There are 8 variables: GDP per capita, private capital 
stock per capita, public capital stock per capita, government subsidies, government consumption, 
government social security transfers, tax revenue ratio to GDP, and the public debt ratio to GDP.  The 
maximum lag was 3.  This produced a total of  262,144 possible combinations:  AIC, SBC and HQC 
selected an ARDL (1,2,0,1,0,0,0,3) while the RBSC selected a (1,2,1,1,0,1,0,3) model.    21
 
Table 9 
Estimated Long-Run Coefficients for the GDP per capita 
1950 – 2002 
 AIC  RBSC  SBC  HQC 
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Standard errors in (). *Significant at the .01 level.** Significant at the .05 level. *** Significant at the  .10 
level 
 
Government expenditure in consumption or social security has no statistically 
significant effect on per-capita GDP, while subsidies have a negative impact.  The 
positive effect of public debt ratio is somewhat puzzling and could reflect an endogeneity 
problem i.e. that as GDP per capita increases there is a larger demand for financial assets 
and public bonds is one of those assets that domestic agents demand.  To examine this 
hypothesis, we used Granger causality tests and the Wu-Hausman exogeneity test and 
both lead to the non-rejection of the exogenous public debt hypothesis. 
 
In the short run (Table 10) private capital has a greater impact on GDP per capita 
than the public capital.  Government expenditures have no effect on GDP, and tax rates 
have a negative impact on GDP. Public debt has also negative impact on GDP per capita 
in the short-run. 
 
The long run results are puzzling for two reasons.  First, because the high public 
capital elasticity and, second, because the fact that the public sector elasticity is higher 
than the private one.  This fact is also present in several of the classic studies for the US 
and OECD economies, such as Aschauer(1989), Ram and Ramsey (1989), Eisner (1994), 
Sturn and de Haan (1995), Balmaseda (1997) and Viverberg (1997).  Hurlin (2001a, 
2001b) shows that, in general, papers based on time series analysis of variables in levels, 
like the present one, tend to find large output elasticities of public capital.  Hurlin shows 
that there are two potential sources of bias for this finding: a) the endogeneity of the 
factors of production, i.e. the fact that the productivity of private capital may depend on 
the level of public capital; and b) the fact that in most of those studies the output and the 
inputs are not cointegrated and the variables are non-stationary leading to the spurious 
regression problem. 
   22
The first source of bias may not be a serious problem in this specific case, given the 
ARDL methodology produces consistent estimates of the long run coefficients (Pesaran 
an Shin, 1997).  We tested for the correlation between both private and public capital and 
the residual of the regression, and were unable to reject the exogeneity of these variables.   
The second source of potential bias may be a problem, because based on the ARDL 
approach and the proposed method to test for long run relationships (Pesaran, Shin and 
Smith, 1999) the computed F-statistic between the upper and lower bounds that do not 
allow firm rejection or non-rejection of the null hypothesis of no long-run relationship. 
 
Table 10 
Error-correction Representation for the Selected ARDL models 1952-2002 
Dependent variable: d GDP per capita 
 AIC  RBSC  SBC  HQC 
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 R
2  0.88 0.89 0.88 0.88 
D.W.  1.99 1.92 1.99 1.99 
*   Significant at the .01 level. ** Significant at the .05 level. *** Significant at the  .10 level 
 
To examine further this potential problem, we adopted a multiple equation 
cointegrating VAR approach.  This approach will also allow examination of relationships 
between variables that the single-equation ARDL approach did not allow.  With the same 
set of variables, we were unable to reject the hypothesis of up to four cointegrating 
vectors.  To reduce the dimensionality of the problem (and based on the variance 
decomposition) we excluded the debt variable and were able to reduce the number of 
cointegrating vectors to two.
12 
                                                 
12 See Appendix for the cointegration tests. One of the vectors, however, showed no persistence in the 
deviations from the equilibrium relationship to system-wide shocks.  The other vector, on the contrary,   23
 
With the specified system of six variables we examined the response of per capita 
GDP to multiple shocks with the Generalized Impulse Response Function.  A one 
standard deviation shock to public capital (1.7 percent of GDP) that at the end of the 
simulation period (10 years) implies a higher public capital stock by almost 7 percent  is 
associated with a 5 percent higher GDP (Figure 17); this fact implies a long-run elasticity 
of about  .7, almost identical to the long run elasticity estimated by the single-equation 
(ARDL) method.  This approach, however, has the advantage of allowing examination of 
the impact of this shock on other variables. For instance, such a shock to public capital is 
also associated with an increase in private capital of almost 5 percent by the end of the 
forecasting horizon (Fig.18) verifying some degree of complementarity between both 
types of capital. 
A shock to private capital stock, representing a rise of six percent (in the long run) is 
associated with a higher GDP by 4 percent (Fig. 19).  This would imply a long-run 
elasticity of about .6, much higher than the one estimated by the ARDL. 
 
Figure 17 
 Generalized Impulse Response(s) to one S.E. shock in the equation for
LKSTPUBP
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showed temporary deviations from the equilibrium relationship returning after a few years.  We arbitrarily 
eliminated the first one and remained with a single cointegrating vector.    24
Figure 19 
 Generalized Impulse Response(s) to one S.E. shock in the equation for
LKSTPRPC










Another interesting result refers to the impact of a tax shock.  A permanent 
increase of the tax ratio (of 1.5 percent of GDP) is associated with a lower GDP per 
capita of close to 1 percent (Figure 20), similar to the ARDL result. The same shock is 
associated with a lower private capital stock (Figure 21) 
 
Figure 20 
 Generalized Impulse Response(s) to one S.E. shock in the equation for
TOTTAXGD










 Generalized Impulse Response(s) to one S.E. shock in the equation for
TOTTAXGD












A shock that leads to a permanent rise of government consumption expenditure 
(of 7 percent in real terms) is associated with a fall in per capita GDP (Figure 22). This 
shock is associated with a higher tax ratio (Figure 23), lower private capital stock (Fig 
24) and lower public capital stock as well (Figure 25).   25
Figure 22 
 Generalized Impulse Response(s) to one S.E. shock in the equation for
LGOVCONP
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Figure 25 
 Generalized Impulse Response(s) to one S.E. shock in the equation for
LGOVCONP












The other two types of government expenditures, namely the subsidies and social 
security transfers have negligible effects on GDP in the medium term and opposing 
effects in the long run. Given the small size of this type of expenditure, we will focus 
here on the effect of social security transfers (see appendix for results of subsidies). 
Social security transfers have a negative growth effect (Figure 26), primarily because of 
the associated reduction in the public sector capital (Figure 27). A 5 percent increase in 
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Figure 27 
 Generalized Impulse Response(s) to one S.E. shock in the equation for
LGOVSSTP












V.  Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 
During the past decade, the successful episodes of Brazilian stabilization coincide 
with those when fiscal policy was flexible to increase primary surpluses, while crises 
emerge when there is little flexibility to adjust this fiscal variable to external shocks.  For 
instance, the 1998-1999 episodes show the importance of the primary balance as a 
signaling tool in a world of imperfect information. In contrast to the 1998-1999 
stabilization, fiscal policy was unresponsive to shocks in 2002, causing concerns of fiscal 
policy sustainability. Compounded by electoral uncertainty, the situation ended in the 
2002 debt crisis 
 
Brazilian fiscal adjustment has been of mixed quality. On one hand, most of the 
adjustment has been revenue-based and cutting capital expenditures. In the early 1990s, 
the tax burden was 25% of GDP while in 2005 it reached 37%.  On the other hand, the 
expenditure composition shows the rising trend in social security and assistance transfers. 
 
Our findings show that Brazilian fiscal policy is procyclical in the short run:  
output expansions are associated with smaller primary balances, while output 
contractions with higher ones.  In the long run, however, the evidence shows that fiscal 
policy is countercyclical, that is a 1% increase in output is associated with a higher 
primary balance of 0.2% of GDP.  
  
  The analyses presented in this paper support the contention that Brazil may 
benefit from increased public spending in the area of economic infrastructure.  The 
econometric analysis using historical data from Brazil indicates positive and strong 
growth effects of public physical capital stock and public investments.  The analysis 
points out clearly the negative effects of increasing taxation on economic growth.  Thus, 
it is not advisable for Brazil to pursue its need for increasing public investments via 
expansionary fiscal policy that results in a higher tax burden than the current level.   
Instead, a long-run solution to recovering an adequate level of public investments must be 
sought in reallocation of public spending within the fixed overall fiscal envelope.  This 
means the need to re-examine the composition of the current expenditures, including 
those allocated to the social sectors that today consume a lion’s share of Brazil’s public 
expenditures.   28
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Appendix 
 
Cointegrating Vector Autoregression Tests and Impulse Response Function Analysis 
 
Cointegration with unrestricted intercepts and restricted trends in the VAR 
   Cointegration LR Test Based on Maximal Eigenvalue of the Stochastic Matrix 
******************************************************************************* 
 51 observations from 1952 to 2002. Order of VAR = 2, chosen r =1. 
 List of variables included in the cointegrating vector: 
 LGDPPC          LKSTPRPC        LKSTPUBPC       LGOVCONPC       LGOVSUBPC 
 LGOVSSTPC       TOTTAXGDP       Trend 
 List of eigenvalues in descending order: 
.63450     .53440     .42087     .31868     .26409     .21144     .12765 
******************************************************************************* 
 Null    Alternative    Statistic     95% Critical Value     90% Critical Value 
 r = 0      r = 1        51.3303           49.3200                46.5400 
 r<= 1      r = 2        38.9854           43.6100                40.7600 
 r<= 2      r = 3        27.8577           37.8600                35.0400 
 r<= 3      r = 4        19.5700           31.7900                29.1300 
 r<= 4      r = 5        15.6387           25.4200                23.1000 
 r<= 5      r = 6        12.1146           19.2200                17.1800 
 r<= 6      r = 7         6.9649           12.3900                10.5500 
******************************************************************************* 





  Cointegration with unrestricted intercepts and restricted trends in the VAR 
          Cointegration LR Test Based on Trace of the Stochastic Matrix 
******************************************************************************* 
 51 observations from 1952 to 2002. Order of VAR = 2, chosen r =1. 
 List of variables included in the cointegrating vector: 
 LGDPPC          LKSTPRPC        LKSTPUBPC       LGOVCONPC       LGOVSUBPC 
 LGOVSSTPC       TOTTAXGDP       Trend 
 List of eigenvalues in descending order: 
.63450     .53440     .42087     .31868     .26409     .21144     .12765 
******************************************************************************* 
 Null    Alternative    Statistic     95% Critical Value     90% Critical Value 
 r = 0      r>= 1       172.4616          147.2700               141.8200 
 r<= 1      r>= 2       121.1312          115.8500               110.6000 
 r<= 2      r>= 3        82.1459           87.1700                82.8800 
 r<= 3      r>= 4        54.2882           63.0000                59.1600 
 r<= 4      r>= 5        34.7182           42.3400                39.3400 
 r<= 5      r>= 6        19.0795           25.7700                23.0800 
 r<= 6      r = 7         6.9649           12.3900                10.5500 
******************************************************************************* 




  Generalized Impulse Response(s) to one S.E. shock in the equation for LKSTPRPC 
  Cointegration with unrestricted intercepts and restricted trends in the VAR 
******************************************************************************* 
 51 observations from 1952 to 2002. Order of VAR = 2, chosen r =1. 
 List of variables included in the cointegrating vector: 
 LGDPPC          LKSTPRPC        LKSTPUBPC       LGOVCONPC       LGOVSUBPC 
 LGOVSSTPC       TOTTAXGDP       Trend 
******************************************************************************* 
Horizon   LGDPPC     LKSTPRPC   LKSTPUBPC   LGOVCONPC   LGOVSUBPC   LGOVSSTPC 
   0     .016627     .014562    .0081256    -.027974     .065454   -.0021766 
   1     .025658     .025405     .017731    -.022943     .078764     .021051 
   2     .032214     .034483     .024337    -.019048      .12571     .019772 
   3     .036514     .042148     .027711    -.017208      .18766     .012425 
   4     .038430     .048152     .029311    -.017943      .22577    .0074402 
   5     .039295     .052737     .029744    -.019157      .25001    .0035185 
   6     .039490     .056160     .029280    -.020368      .26836   -.4930E-3 
   7     .039177     .058662     .028179    -.021643      .28219   -.0044187 
   8     .038493     .060430     .026667    -.022958      .29192   -.0080820 
   9     .037573     .061621     .024921    -.024256      .29833    -.011413 
  10     .036518     .062364     .023068    -.025493      .30221    -.014404 
******************************************************************************* 
Horizon TOTTAXGDP 
   0   -.0035154   31
   1   -.0032477 
   2   -.0037751 
   3   -.0048950 
   4   -.0056279 
   5   -.0063279 
   6   -.0069067 
   7   -.0074023 
   8   -.0078145 
   9   -.0081562 
10  -.0084361 
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Generalized Impulse Response(s) to one S.E. shock in the equation for LKSTPUBP 
  Cointegration with unrestricted intercepts and restricted trends in the VAR 
******************************************************************************* 
 51 observations from 1952 to 2002. Order of VAR = 2, chosen r =1. 
 List of variables included in the cointegrating vector: 
 LGDPPC          LKSTPRPC        LKSTPUBPC       LGOVCONPC       LGOVSUBPC 
 LGOVSSTPC       TOTTAXGDP       Trend 
******************************************************************************* 
Horizon   LGDPPC     LKSTPRPC   LKSTPUBPC   LGOVCONPC   LGOVSUBPC   LGOVSSTPC 
   0     .011345    .0070947     .016677    -.016558      .13219    .0063188 
   1     .020634     .015807     .026809   -.0067698      .23730   -.0060201 
   2     .025799     .022133     .036551   -.0075954      .25341    .0045782 
   3     .031537     .027663     .044658   -.0048371      .27439     .010285 
   4     .036295     .032347     .050987   -.0022790      .30233     .012683 
   5     .040048     .036364     .055915   -.5244E-3      .32659     .014249 
   6     .042933     .039740     .059719    .6821E-3      .34608     .015279 
   7     .045161     .042550     .062610    .0015243      .36203     .015855 
   8     .046851     .044866     .064752    .0020973      .37521     .016022 
   9     .048101     .046757     .066294    .0024504      .38597     .015908 
  10     .048999     .048283     .067361    .0026355      .39464     .015602 
******************************************************************************* 
Horizon TOTTAXGDP 
   0   -.0010629 
   1   -.0029719 
   2   -.0023302 
   3   -.0027585 
   4   -.0028822 
   5   -.0031124 
   6   -.0033051 
   7   -.0034995 
   8   -.0036784 
   9   -.0038433 
  10   -.0039918 
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Generalized Impulse Response(s) to one S.E. shock in the equation for LGOVCONP 
  Cointegration with unrestricted intercepts and restricted trends in the VAR 
******************************************************************************* 
 51 observations from 1952 to 2002. Order of VAR = 2, chosen r =1. 
 List of variables included in the cointegrating vector: 
 LGDPPC          LKSTPRPC        LKSTPUBPC       LGOVCONPC       LGOVSUBPC 
 LGOVSSTPC       TOTTAXGDP       Trend 
******************************************************************************* 
Horizon   LGDPPC     LKSTPRPC   LKSTPUBPC   LGOVCONPC   LGOVSUBPC   LGOVSSTPC 
   0   -.0012266   -.0049725   -.0033710     .081918    -.057157     .015833 
   1   -.0063342    -.010616   -.0073041     .075264    -.067279    .0030389 
   2   -.0079829    -.013413    -.012694     .076846    -.035017   -.0098600 
   3    -.011856    -.016518    -.016313     .073536    -.058934   -.0096376 
   4    -.013946    -.019063    -.018720     .072293    -.081661   -.0082162 
   5    -.015388    -.021208    -.020534     .072024    -.094137   -.0083018 
   6    -.016416    -.022924    -.021836     .071817     -.10318   -.0081722 
   7    -.017176    -.024302    -.022719     .071701     -.11080   -.0078422 
   8    -.017687    -.025394    -.023268     .071678     -.11702   -.0073495 
   9    -.018002    -.026250    -.023566     .071742     -.12186   -.0068164 
  10    -.018170    -.026908    -.023678     .071857     -.12555   -.0062669 
******************************************************************************* 
Horizon TOTTAXGDP 
   0    .0017484 
   1    .0047379 
   2    .0027171 
   3    .0036730 
   4    .0036370 
   5    .0038785 
   6    .0040138 
   7    .0041622 
   8    .0042856   34
   9    .0043956 
10  .0044900 
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Generalized Impulse Response(s) to one S.E. shock in the equation for LGOVSUBP 
  Cointegration with unrestricted intercepts and restricted trends in the VAR 
******************************************************************************* 
 51 observations from 1952 to 2002. Order of VAR = 2, chosen r =1. 
 List of variables included in the cointegrating vector: 
 LGDPPC          LKSTPRPC        LKSTPUBPC       LGOVCONPC       LGOVSUBPC 
 LGOVSSTPC       TOTTAXGDP       Trend 
******************************************************************************* 
Horizon   LGDPPC     LKSTPRPC   LKSTPUBPC   LGOVCONPC   LGOVSUBPC   LGOVSSTPC 
   0   -.1834E-3    .0023221    .0053709    -.011407      .41045    .0034785 
   1   -.0047233    .0049580     .013452    -.021805      .32514     .010230 
   2   -.9571E-3    .0062209     .022980    -.022905      .27741     .032231 
   3    .0045022    .0076236     .031443    -.017983      .27732     .041459 
   4    .0096596    .0093974     .038792    -.013884      .29225     .047777 
   5     .014024     .011326     .045221    -.010722      .30559     .053166 
   6     .017830     .013276     .050848   -.0081610      .31705     .057953 
   7     .021157     .015171     .055709   -.0059682      .32808     .061845 
   8     .024033     .016968     .059859   -.0041309      .33866     .064958 
   9     .026486     .018635     .063367   -.0026175      .34846     .067429 
  10     .028557     .020154     .066304   -.0013854      .35734     .069374 
******************************************************************************* 
Horizon TOTTAXGDP 
   0   -.7778E-3 
   1    .3645E-3 
   2    .3748E-3 
   3    .0010129 
   4    .0013059 
   5    .0015825 
   6    .0017642 
   7    .0018906 
   8    .0019685   36
   9    .0020116 
10  .0020281 
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Generalized Impulse Response(s) to one S.E. shock in the equation for LGOVSSTP 
  Cointegration with unrestricted intercepts and restricted trends in the VAR 
******************************************************************************* 
 51 observations from 1952 to 2002. Order of VAR = 2, chosen r =1. 
 List of variables included in the cointegrating vector: 
 LGDPPC          LKSTPRPC        LKSTPUBPC       LGOVCONPC       LGOVSUBPC 
 LGOVSSTPC       TOTTAXGDP       Trend 
******************************************************************************* 
Horizon   LGDPPC     LKSTPRPC   LKSTPUBPC   LGOVCONPC   LGOVSUBPC   LGOVSSTPC 
   0    .0019381   -.2959E-3    .9837E-3     .012107     .013328      .10713 
   1    .0011795    .0019477   -.4699E-3     .016922    -.010570     .089721 
   2    .0013863    .0043558   -.0050918     .017783     .058960     .072903 
   3   -.0017314    .0056782   -.0096745     .014180     .071031     .065039 
   4   -.0045051    .0062943    -.013813     .010979     .067746     .060818 
   5   -.0070145    .0063708    -.017774    .0087731     .066225     .056110 
   6   -.0093581    .0061167    -.021497    .0068146     .064668     .051854 
   7    -.011573    .0056307    -.024917    .0050500     .061720     .048211 
   8    -.013606    .0049960    -.027999    .0034921     .057748     .045181 
   9    -.015435    .0042769    -.030739    .0021527     .053336     .042646 
  10    -.017060    .0035230    -.033146    .0010106     .048797     .040543 
******************************************************************************* 
Horizon TOTTAXGDP 
   0    .0054594 
   1    .0062042 
   2    .0042056 
   3    .0040477 
   4    .0034820 
   5    .0031519 
   6    .0028533 
   7    .0026343 
   8    .0024645 
   9    .0023388 
10  .0022474 
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Generalized Impulse Response(s) to one S.E. shock in the equation for TOTTAXGD 
  Cointegration with unrestricted intercepts and restricted trends in the VAR 
******************************************************************************* 
 51 observations from 1952 to 2002. Order of VAR = 2, chosen r =1. 
 List of variables included in the cointegrating vector: 
 LGDPPC          LKSTPRPC        LKSTPUBPC       LGOVCONPC       LGOVSUBPC 
 LGOVSSTPC       TOTTAXGDP       Trend 
******************************************************************************* 
Horizon   LGDPPC     LKSTPRPC   LKSTPUBPC   LGOVCONPC   LGOVSUBPC   LGOVSSTPC 
   0    -.010611   -.0028704   -.9940E-3    .0080314    -.017900     .032794 
   1   -.0096439   -.0023036    .0015858    .0039954    -.091739     .048012 
   2   -.0084657   -.0020037    .0014558    .0081783    -.062058     .039635 
   3   -.0083608   -.0016234    .0013504    .0076156    -.053646     .038901 
   4   -.0085176   -.0013751    .0012866    .0073070    -.054116     .038778 
   5   -.0085598   -.0012086    .0012259    .0071459    -.054266     .038759 
   6   -.0085979   -.0010924    .0011232    .0070904    -.053591     .038484 
   7   -.0086577   -.0010126    .0010006    .0070081    -.053045     .038237 
   8   -.0087319   -.9630E-3    .8713E-3    .0069219    -.052770     .038028 
   9   -.0088097   -.9367E-3    .7422E-3    .0068412    -.052651     .037848 
  10   -.0088870   -.9276E-3    .6171E-3    .0067688    -.052621     .037689 
******************************************************************************* 
Horizon TOTTAXGDP 
   0     .017834 
   1     .014326 
   2     .014827 
   3     .014616 
   4     .014628   40
   5     .014582 
   6     .014557 
   7     .014532 
   8     .014514 
   9     .014498 
10  .014486 
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